The United States of America ratified the *Anti-genocide Convention* only thirty-six years after its initial signature. It was passed to the Senate for the first time by President Harry Truman in 1949. It evoked great controversy as it was perceived as something that might be favorable to communist regimes and possibly be an attack on the basic rights of US citizens. Successive attempts to pass it began much later in 1970 due to the support from Richard Nixon who backed the ratification initiative. The main reason for the reluctance to pass the convention was its record on international jurisdiction on persons responsible for genocide (LeBlanc, 1991).

Other controversies were related to the issue of the intent to commit genocide, which as a descriptive category was perceived as not sufficiently clear or even not precisely characterized. Senators also had doubts on another description which referred to group extermination as a whole or part. They deliberated to what extent partial extermination can be recognized as genocidal (Hirsch, 2002: 4-9).

Nevertheless, despite existing controversies, the United States finally adopted and ratified this act of international law and became the world leader in genocide prevention. Herbert Hirsch claims that each and every prevention policy must commence in the United States, regardless of its ability to prevent or stop genocide alone. Due to its clear and obvious role as a world leader in the post-Cold War order, the United States must participate in any and every effort that aims to counter genocide. In order to initiate this, however, there must be an internal and indigenous movement in the country that fosters such actions (Hirsch, 2002: 10-11). Such a movement should be equally aimed at opposing genocide, as well as fighting for its prevention. This is feasible thanks to concentrating on putting political pressure on political institutions and its leaders and convincing them that the introduction of a policy that prevents genocide is moral, and at the same time politically beneficial (Hirsch, 2002: 17). The ultimate goal of building such a political structure is the development of a political consciousness of how important the problem of genocide has become, as
well as the empowerment of individuals to see their active role in this problem and their options to participate in the humanitarian movement to put an end to this crime. In this sense, the movement to put an end to genocide is an intermediary structure between an individual and the contemporary nation-state (Hirsch, 2002: 33). Greg Stanton sees this movement as the engine driving a cultural shift, which, if strong enough, can effectively impact the authorities. However, he also highlights the fact that, in his opinion, hitherto social movements have not managed to change the Congress’s or the government’s approach to foreign policy in this matter (Stanton, 2014). Such a movement needs to have an impact on political decision-making processes, or more broadly, on law-making at the national level, as well as the international level. Scott Calnan calls such a process the mobilization of law, the process in which the legal system acquires its cases or the substance that it can subsequently deal with. The law is mobilized whenever desires or wants are translated into demands as an assertion of rights (Calnan, 2008: 20). The law can be mobilized by individuals, groups or institutions, although the law itself, in this view, is not understood as a body of rules that have a determinate social realm, but as a process of struggle in order to interpret certain facts by means of predetermined rules. Usually, the activities of human rights organizations are seen as being directed at challenging prevailing meanings and replacing them with their own, with minority meanings that have not yet made their way into the official canon of meaning. When such attempts are successful, it can be said that societal change emerges and universalizes itself to social presence, or the arena of social relations has aligned with actual cases and at the same time may have impacted power redistribution in society at large (Calnan, 2008: 21).

Each victory in legal disputes contributes to the general goals of the social movement, expanding the negotiation space between authority and this movement, enabling the enforcement of the state to support the achievement of the movement’s goals. Furthermore, it independently affects society at large through normative change, regulating a particular area of social life. Facilitating expectations for a forthcoming change, such a victory beyond doubt contributes to an increase in the morale of the members of the social movement, and could equally lead to the expansion of its core by means of deeper
engagement of those who latterly doubted the effectiveness of the movement’s actions. The power of the law has an effect on defining the goals of such a movement, its external perception, which is particularly true for human rights protection movements which are naturally focused on actions around the advocacy of normative change. It is worth paying attention to reservations made by Henkin who made a distinction between movements focused on the rights of Americans, citizen’s rights, and movements connected to the international system of protecting human rights. Both discourses have their own individual history, separate ideologies and roots, and different social backgrounds (Henkin, 1999: 33). The level of human rights observance depends to a large extent on the ways that domestic and international rights discourses create a dialogue with one another, and are reconciled (Calnan, 2008: 23).

It is also worth bearing in mind that the specifics of international law as a system that to a lesser extent relies on a centralized enforcement of power, and is usually interpreted as not being connected to judiciary rulings, gives social movements better opportunities to act in terms of mobilizing the law in the name of virtues important to such a movement’s vital interests. The interpretation of law adopted by the movement can be set as a framework of advocacy towards public opinion or decision makers. The main reason for mobilizing the law at an international level is to gain the support of the international community, the engagement of as many countries as possible for particular action – this usually referring to the enforcement of the interpretation of particular norms in another country in relation to the status of individuals or groups in this state. These enforcement activities might take the form of effective sanctions, including armed intervention, but can be strictly symbolic when enforced by diplomatic approaches when the state sees that complying with a particular interpretation of international norms at stake is in its best interest in maintaining present diplomatic relations.

We need to assume the importance of the opinion of Burnstein that for mobilizing the law for a certain case, the degree of mobilizing the movement and its recourse becomes more important than the extent of human rights infringements and the needs of people affected and suffering (Burnstein, 1991: 1209). This shows that humanitarian crises, human rights violations, and other breaches of international humanitarian law rarely prompt any response just because of the evil they cause. Empathy or compassion fosters a reaction only after the case is perceived and gains social interest, therefore, somebody spreading information on the event and using their professional experience, talents or resources intends to introduce a reaction (Epp, 1998: 8). According to Tarrow, contemporary mass mobilization possibilities are seen as moderately optimistic due to the fact that the existing model of the organization of social movements seems to be a combination of narrow professional leadership, large but passive forms of people’s support, and relationships resembling personal structure networks. In such a system, members of the organization communicate with its leaders by means of mail, fax, and e-mail, or take part in large but rare massive demonstrations, or take responsibility for small but unexpected
demonstration outbreaks or activities, performed by trained teams of civic militia (Tarrow, 1994: 133).

A model example of this type of social movement is Greenpeace or Amnesty International. This model shows something that will be presented below, describing the activity of non-governmental organizations, i.e., there is a visible change in the forms of engagement within the societal movement, from personal volunteering to financial support primarily. As previously mentioned, interest in this problem and knowledge on its nature are indispensable factors of subsequent engagement. This relationship makes the emergence of the anti-genocide movement slower than expected by organizations engaged in its creation. Furthermore, as highlighted by Holly Dranginis from the Enough Project, the media are causing a great problem as they find interest in or begin dealing with certain problems only if violence occurs on a massive scale, which is often far too late to do anything to resolve the situation (Dranginis, 2014). The reduced visibility of genocide issues among US citizens is also caused by the fact that genocide appears to be something distant and irrelevant to their everyday life. The causalities of genocide cannot affect politics or US public opinion as they do not have representatives in the US. This, in turn, signifies lesser interest in the problems of certain groups or a world region in the US. This also signifies lesser motivation to take action. If the region is far away and media coverage is low, there is a high probability that the US will not respond (Hirsch, 2002: 33-34). To change this, organizations fighting genocide aim to educate and enlighten people on the nature of the genocide and how it affects humanity, and not only the victims of this crime. It is important to emphasize how crucial it is to stop genocide and prevent future outbreaks (Hirsch, 2002: 35). One of the many strategies proposed by NGOs is a reform of the effectiveness of their actions directed at a change in foreign policy as led by states, particularly the US (Calnan, 2008: 37-41). To disseminate such knowledge within the society in an efficient manner, movements, as well as having a certain level of organizational structure, must also acquire sufficient resources. This will be further discussed under the classification proposed by Calnan (Calnan, 2008: 173-176). The primary resource is obviously financial, however, cultural capital seems equally significant; this consists of the ability to gain knowledge, write, and appeal to, most often, intellectuals or academics. It is interesting to note, as Calnan observes, that in many countries individuals who are enriched by such cultural capital are expected to speak out in political matters and demonstrate moral sensitivity (Calnan, 2008: 173). This is expected as an ethical obligation from these people, prompting them to be natural leaders of prospective social movements. However, in order to implement an efficient strategy of political pressure and achieve results, the social movement must have access to professionals and experts. US NGOs are characterized by gaining recognition and focusing their activities on lobbying by hiring professional personnel. Another indispensable resource is mapping the legal frames in order to justify their actions. In the space that is derived from a legal foundation, it is extremely difficult to find effective tools to resolve key problems of emerging social movements. These legal frameworks
are connected to the organization, its internal rules, its ability to engage in public affairs and maintain relations with authorities, be responsible for politics, as well as the existence of human rights protection jurisprudence. The emerging anti-genocide movement will obviously appeal to the norms of international law, as it firstly sanctions the protection of human rights which is severely infringed by genocide, and secondly, it seeks such international law mechanisms that will realize such protection. Due to this complicity, many organization coalitions with networks within the movement focus on the promotion of the mechanism of Responsibility to Protect – R2P. This is perceived as a hope to revive the effective protection of human rights in the post-Cold War era, not governed by opposing, binary political blocks, but by the principle of sovereignty. This principle is declared as the most frequent excuse for armed humanitarian intervention and it seems that UN reluctance to take decisive action to support such solutions is related to the burden of Cold War relations. An identified goal of the anti-genocide movement is to break the impasse caused by the inactivity of Western countries in global foreign policy. This can only be achieved by evolution in international law or the necessity of customizing it.

Another important resource that aids the efficiency of social movements are volunteers; at a low cost, they can bring meaningful benefits to such a movement and support the need for pro-social engagement. The importance of volunteering is significant in many aspects. It helps with the simple things but can also contribute to the very highest professional level or level of expertise, although most frequently it simply increases the scale of the movement. What is particularly interesting is the reciprocal relationship between serial participants of a movement and its leaders. Tarrow indicates likewise that participation in a social movement not only increases political awareness but also empowers the participants both in their psychological readiness to take risks, but also politically, i.e., gaining new social skills and expanding perspectives (Tarrow, 1994: 166).

The next resource available is the information that is gathered and accumulated by the movement. Knowledge about the authorities’ actions and the capacity to utilize this in adequate time constitutes the basic component of an effective strategy of an organized social movement trying to solve social problems. Together with the information revolution, we have seen the rise of the importance of this resource, firstly due to the freedom that the internet has brought, with information previously deliberately hidden or not readily available, such as information about the government, but now free of predictable control, and secondly due to the possibility of disseminating information quickly and efficiently through social channel technologies at a scale previously unheard of, often with the exclusion of traditional media, which historically had a monopoly on deciding whether particular information reaches the public or not.

Paradoxically, the internet and social media have grown in significance becoming one of the primary sources of information about the world. This has also changed the strategy of traditional broadcasters and social movements. Once, in order to receive credible information about genocide in a certain part of the world, it was necessary
to send war reporters, broadcast reports, acquire recordings, acquire photos, develop them, analyze them and, then finally, possibly publish them. Nowadays, the same information, through smartphones, the cloud, and online apps, reaches the media in real time directly from the participants of the event, both the victims and perpetrators. There is no time for a prior analysis of the incoming information or pictures, which has consequences for social movements, which are focused on the protection of human rights, making previous action strategies obsolete. Open and quick access to information has more often than not become a nightmare rather than an asset for the human rights protection movement as traditional media prefer negative and drastic messages. This makes it difficult to prove the legitimacy of the anti-genocide movement, as Richard Downie told the author; former strategies relied on a simplified description of the situation and presented a black and white dichotomy in order to achieve their expected results (Downie, 2014). Such strategies would have been justifiable with the ethical acceptance of the possible outcomes of such a choice, namely stopping the occurrence of genocide. However, the image of genocide is not as clear as it was often presented to the public. This was expressly emphasized by Alan Kuperman in his comments to the ideas of Madeleine K. Albright and William S. Cohen (Albright and Cohen, 2008) in their report on the prevention of genocide. He noted that according to the report each case of mass killing or ethnic cleansing is seen as similar to the Holocaust, in which pleasant, loving people who live peacefully are stigmatized and then all killed by a mad man who gains power (Kuperman, 2014). Kuperman is convinced that the Holocaust was the only genocide of its kind, and other genocide events that have happened contemporarily do not resemble it at all, but they have been fought between numerous groups, none of which were pleasant or unarmed. On the contrary, all have been aggressive, repulsive, and criminal, which prompts the important question of how to prevent genocide in such circumstances. Hitherto, people chose the party they stood for and had control of the flow of information. This process was fairly well presented in *The Bang Bang Club* movie by Steven Silver, based on actual events, describing the work of war reporters. There is a scene in the film in which one of the protagonists delivers some gory pictures from an inter-ethnic clash, brutal killings, and the editors of various international magazines decide which images can be published and seen by the public. Nowadays, this particular privilege of the traditional media and the enforced comfort of its audience have come to an end, as uncensored, unprocessed information reaches the audience almost immediately after the event takes place, practically stripped of all commentary. Regardless of its explicitness and thanks to the World Wide Web, we can watch everything from different angles and perspectives, often in HD quality.

This graphic reality is a significant problem and challenge for human rights movements, who are currently facing a negative form of narration, when information and broadcasts related to the so-called “migration crisis” is used to criticize human rights defenders and victims of mass human rights violations, strengthening social integralism.
Access to information on genocide through traditional media channels is therefore indispensable as a lack of information among the audience, be it readers or listeners, about genocidal atrocities from those channels, makes this issue irrelevant to the public and does not prompt any response or gain public interest, and as a result does not evoke any pressure to prevent the crime itself. However, it is worth highlighting the fact that whenever human rights infringements take place in distant regions, ordinary citizens are not willing to engage unless trendsetting celebrities or people who take political responsibility take a leading role in raising awareness that the prevention of genocide is socially important (Hirsch, 2002: 42).

We can confirm the inclusion of certain issues in the political agenda once the public expresses an interest; politicians are then eager to act for such a cause. It is important though to show genocide in a way that will attract public opinion. It is clear that images of crimes, innocent genocide victims and images of suffering have a significant impact on evoking compassion in the audience. A positive narration about these victims increases the probability of gaining greater support. The balanced portrayal of causalities, giving the stories of individuals, immersed in a social or family context, gains public interest and puts greater pressure on political decision makers. Hirsch notes, however, that despite efforts, some information is ignored or depreciated if issuing a warning results in confronting a difficult or unpopular political decision (Hirsch, 2002: 133). It seems though that the main role of social movements on the prevention of mass atrocities and human rights violations focuses on the gathering, disclosing, and promoting of positive broadcasts, and the rectification and correction of negative information, fake news or news that is derived from a historical or social context, especially if such negative information is attached to the victims of mass human rights violations.

The following resource, essential to the effective achievement of the goals assumed by a social movement and indicated by Calnan, provides an access to decision makers, subjects of authority, and other institutions that have the power to make final decisions. Such access is vital primarily for the exchange of information, accessing official data from the government and establishing a base for direct
or indirect contact for transmitting statements and maintaining legitimacy. For this reason, Hirsch believes that the anti-genocide movement needs to be directed at the President of the United States and the US Congress. This movement, due to a lack of adequate financial resources, will also mobilize great numbers of supporters and activists in order to put pressure on decision makers.

In the case of the United States, prevalent attempts to influence the attitude of politicians on the prevention of genocide should take place during primary election campaigns and election campaigns, especially the presidential one. Candidates need to address the nation on their position on the protection of human rights around the world. They should reveal how important the issue of the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities is for their foreign policy. Such decisions need to be never seen as controversial, difficult or unpopular. Pressure from campaign donors is particularly important here (Hirsch, 2002: 65). Usually, this sponsorship comes from international corporations who on the one hand are concerned for business-related social responsibility, but on the other hand have vital interests in supporting the stability and democratization of developing countries, as such a change can secure a stable environment for investment. It is worth mentioning that the effective campaign conducted by the Save Darfur Now coalition around the divestment act for Sudan caused a massive outflow of capital and the withdrawal of major global corporations from Sudan. Such actions are particularly important as previous experiences proved that when US foreign policy-making institutional leaders were confronted by genocide situations they were not capable or willing to actually stop or implement deterrents on those perpetrating such heinous crimes (Hirsch, 2002: 70). In an interview the author undertook with Hirsch, the interviewee declared pessimism with respect to the development and strength of the anti-genocide movement. Hirsh stated that it has been hitherto limited to students and activists, groups having no influence on the establishment. Of course, while they are capable of expanding the movement by mobilizing and even including celebrities or singular congressmen and congresswomen for the cause of saving lives, in the final analysis, this has not led to any real change in government policy (Hirsch, 2014). This is no doubt related to the ideas of another interviewee, Jonas Claes, who said: “the visibility or influence of the campaign cannot be simply associated with its effectiveness.” (Claes, 2014)

There are two major factors affecting US foreign policy according to Hirsch: (i) national interest resting on power and sovereignty and (ii) election or partisan interest resting on public opinion polls and the prediction of the impact of the decision-making process on the victory of the next election. Furthermore, the author sees US politics as resting on the ethics of apologizing, not the ethics of action. Instead of taking action to stop and deter genocide, the United States often apologizes for its years of inaction well after the crime has been committed. In the case of Africa, this is caused by the perception of the region both by the US and other world powers as being simply peripheral (Hirsch, 2002: 89). Presently China is more interested in the African continent, however, for obvious reasons, this concern is not related to any support for democratic transformation, not to mention the protection of human
rights. Similarly, the Chinese government, like the US government, cannot be a partner in the dialogue for the prevention of genocide. Although Hirsch claims no country is able to wear the mantle of a global police force, the United States, together with its international partners, could, if they were willing to do so, have taken initiatives to strengthen prevention and deterrence mechanisms available within the UN (Hirsch, 2002: 108).

In this sense, another important asset of social movements mentioned by Canlan which could make a valuable contribution is the legitimacy to take actions for a particular cause. This refers to the movement’s representativeness which is important for decision makers, especially if it covers their constituency. This defines also the perceived moral authority of the movement, which, if widespread enough and speaking to common democratic values, might influence the decision-making process. This is strictly dependent, however, on the movement’s credibility, the information that it publicly disseminates and the support it receives from victims of human rights violations, whose lives it is speaking for. It is equally important for the anti-genocide movement to not only call for military options as a universal remedy for the perpetration of genocide. Princeton Lyman claims that the further development of the movement is dependent on a broader perception of prevention frameworks and that average US citizens must not think that support for the prevention of genocide movement means sending US soldiers to the front (Lyman, 2014). A particular balance in relations between the representation of the movement and the government must also be maintained because, as Calnan claims, the more this movement relies on the current determinants of government policy, the less it is perceived by the government as legitimate in introducing change (Calnan, 2008: 175).

The next important resource of the movement is a feature related to its representativeness and the necessity of building up the movement through social organization networking. Such cooperation is always empowering, as assets, staff, and experience are exchanged between cooperating stakeholders. Bringing together efforts helps organizations engage in the protection of human rights; previously dispersed, they can now act as a singularly strong and influential body. One of the best examples of such a coalition is Save Darfur Now or ICPR (International Coalition for Responsibility to Protect). Movements with a wide social representation can gain further assets necessary to enhance the effectiveness of the actions taken. This includes support from the government or public institutions for the demands of the movement. The assessment of government cooperation, while maintaining independence, is one of the most valued opportunities in implementing a change in society and aiding the success of social movements.

Nevertheless, it seems that the currently developing anti-genocide movement in the US, the government of which was particularly active during the Darfur crisis, has not yet reached such capabilities, while, as mentioned previously, US government institutions are passive in resolving humanitarian crises. This is the chief reason why Peter Lewis does not believe that such a movement will ever emerge in the US. To back up his opinion, he notes that the term ‘genocide’ is extremely abstract, which
does not motivate Americans to mobilize fast enough to “catch up” with sudden outbreaks of the phenomenon (Lewis, 2014). As is commonly known, the genocide in Rwanda took place over 100 days. For Hirsch, the passiveness of the United States government in this crisis was completely incomprehensible. He indicates that the failure of US policy to stop the Rwandan or Bosnian genocide was not only immoral but also... impractical. In his opinion, contemporary foreign policy must be rooted in the practicality of morality. Deterring or stopping genocide is practical in order to maintain stability and the international exchange of products and services. As he highlights, “(...) moral imperatives were supposed to be, in the new post-Cold War environment, the most practical way to pursue our common national interests, giving foundations to creation of life-saving ethics.” (Hirsch, 2002: 123) Social movements can be helpful in convincing governments to face this simple truth. To publicly present their demands, social movements need to reach a certain level of organization. The most popular form of organizing individuals for resolving social problems is the establishment of a non-governmental organization. The formalization of activities within this framework enables it to set the goals and operations of the movement, access and gather information, testimonies, interviews, develop expertise, and create long-term strategies.

The final asset essential for the effective advocacy of a cause for each social movement is its public recognition. It enables, due to the character of US social activity, the expansion of the ability to raise vast funds, but also – by means of a trademark – it allows for maintaining a dialogue with the authorities or other organizations. It additionally prompts the interest of ordinary citizens in gaining their support and involvement. Dranginis believes that charismatic personalities who are the faces of the movement are essential for its success (Dranginis, 2014). This is the reason why coalitions like Save Darfur Now attempt to utilize the popularity of celebrities in order to involve them in action to solve problems connected to the prevention of genocide. Gaining social recognition might be particularly important for the educational efforts of the movement. The main component of such educational work must include breaking the supremacy of other national interests. Hirsch advocates for the specific rehabilitation of the political process through a change in the perception of international affairs. This signifies shifting the accent from a nationalistic approach to internationalism and raising the question of human rights as a superior ethical imperative. The mechanism that ought to lead to this rests on amendments in socialization patterns and adopting a universal ideology of a system for protecting human rights (Hirsch, 2002: 165).

The universalism of human rights is not unanimously accepted, however, it is hard to imagine any other principle that justifies order in international relations. Political education rarely describes identity or rights in terms of such universalism. Schoolboys, schoolgirls, and students are still taught to cherish their national identities, which narrows down the perspectives of world development and the shaping of human relations. The change of such a social approach, in the long run, would, to a larger extent, benefit the anti-genocide movement compared to invoking the
conscience of political agents. This would shift the perception of the world and the conditions in which genocide or other forms of violence are born (Hirsch, 2002: 179).

A change in the educational policy in democratic societies is certainly possible, but only if there is a consensus to make such an effort. The question of the effectiveness of social movements and their political impact must be posited in this social context. Tarrow claims that finding dependence between the actions of social movements and certain political decisions is still controversial as there is not enough information that might allow the description of such a connection. This, however, does not change the fact that internationalizing forms of action may create the belief in the inevitability of such a change and also affect those changes in the real political process (Tarrow, 1994: 161-162).

It is worth noting, as has already been mentioned above, that the efficiency of the social movement is more dependent on its assets, resources, and capabilities than external factors, even social ones in which the movement takes action. This is the result of organizational processes among citizens who create different entities, usually in the form of non-governmental organizations. Their impact on foreign policy on the prevention of genocide is still very much underestimated albeit priceless. Further research is clearly necessary in this field.

Note
1 This and the following interviews were undertaken as part of the author’s scholarship in Washington, D.C. between August 2013 and March 2014. The author was a scholar of the Polish-American Fulbright Foundation at George Washington University.

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Jonas Claes – is a senior program officer at the US Institute of Peace, where he conducts research and analysis on the prevention of electoral violence and mass atrocities, and efforts to counter violent extremism. In this capacity, Claes coordinates USIP prevention projects and consults senior US and UN officials in fine-tuning prevention practices. He has made numerous public presentations and published peer-reviewed articles, book chapters, and policy briefs on the prevention of violent conflict. Claes has written extensively on the responsibility to protect, including an article on “Protecting Civilians from Mass Atrocities: Meeting the Challenges of R2P Opposition” published in Global Responsibility to Protect in February 2012 and a chapter on “Responsibility to Protect and Peacemaking” in the Praeger volume Peacemaking: From Practice to Theory, co-authored with Dr. Abiodun Williams.

Richard Downie – is deputy director and fellow with the CSIS Africa Program, based in Washington, DC. In this role, he analyzes emerging political, economic, social, and security trends in sub-Saharan Africa with the aim of informing US policymakers, the US military, and members of Congress. Downie recently co-directed a major project commissioned by the US Africa Command that “stress-tested” African states, identifying possible sources of instability in 10 countries during the next decade. He authored the Sudan Country Report in this series. Before, he conducted research and completed writing projects on Africa for the Council on Foreign Relations and the US Institute of Peace. He is a contributor to the Africa section of Freedom House’s annual report, Freedom in the World.

Holly Dranginis – is a Senior Policy Analyst for the Enough Project where she focuses on the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lord’s Resistance Army, and the Central African Republic. Holly is an attorney specializing in international criminal justice, sexual and gender-based violence, and natural resource trafficking. In 2008, she was a consultant to then-ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo, and later led a program in Northern Uganda introducing human rights curriculum into conflict-affected schools.

Herbert Hirsch – is a professor in the Department of Political Science at Virginia Commonwealth University in Richmond, Virginia. He is the author of several books and numerous articles and book reviews, including Genocide and the Politics of Memory (1995) and Anti-Genocide: Building an American Movement to Prevent Genocide (2002). He serves on a number of advisory boards and teaches a course every summer at the University of Toronto on Genocide and Human Rights. He gave a seminar for the policy planning staff at the US Department of State in 1992. Professor Hirsch is one of the co-editors of the journal Genocide Studies International published by the University of Toronto Press.
Alan J. Kuperman – is an Associate Professor of Public Affairs in Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. His research focuses on ethnic conflict, nuclear nonproliferation, and US military intervention. Dr. Kuperman is the author of The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda (Brookings, 2001). Prior to his academic career, Kuperman worked as legislative director for the US Rep. Charles Schumer, legislative assistant for US House Speaker Thomas Foley, chief of staff for US Rep. James Scheuer, and fellow at the US Agency for International Development.

Peter Lewis – is an Associate Professor and the Director of African Studies Program at John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He has written extensively on questions of economic adjustment, democratization, and civil society in Africa; democratic reform and political economy in Nigeria; public attitudes toward reform and democracy in West Africa; and the comparative politics of economic change in Africa and Southeast Asia. His most recent book, Coping with Crisis in African States, examines sources of resilience and fragility across African countries and presents a series of critical cases. He is a member of Council on Foreign Relations and the Research Council of the International Forum for Democratic Studies, and a Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.


Greg Stanton – Gregory H. Stanton is the President of Genocide Watch. He is the Research Professor in Genocide Studies and Prevention at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution of George Mason University, Arlington, Virginia, USA. From 2007 to 2009, he was the President of the International Association of Genocide Scholars. Dr. Stanton served in the State Department (1992-1999), where he drafted the United Nations Security Council resolutions that created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Burundi Commission of Inquiry, and the Central African Arms Flow Commission. He also drafted the UN Peacekeeping Operations resolutions that helped bring about an end to the Mozambique civil war.